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This paper develops the concept of converging institutions and applies it to
nanotechnologies. Starting point are economic and sociological perspectives.
We focus on the entire innovation process of nanotechnologies beginning with
research and development over diﬀusion via downstream sectors until imple-
mentation in ﬁnal goods. The concept is applied to the nano–cluster in the
metropolitan region of Grenoble and a possible converging institution is iden-
tiﬁed.
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Up to the opinion of many experts, nanotechnologies will be the dominating gen-
eral purpose technologies of the next decades (see e.g. BMBF (2004)). In contrast
to ’simple’ product or process innovations, a general purpose technology is char-
acterized by (i) pervasiveness, i.e. it may be adopted to a multitude of uses, (ii)
innovational complementarities, i.e. it aﬀects the innovation process in upward and
downward industries and at the same time is itself aﬀected by these innovations, and
(iii) induces reorganization of working processes and with this of societal structures.
The notion ’nanotechnologies’ uniﬁes technologies that work at the molecular scale.
The generic function they provide includes the possibility to manipulate molecular
structures, to assemble single atoms and to build completely new structures. There
exist lots of application possibilities, e.g. the implantation in the human body,
in microelectronic components or in chemical gas. Therefore nanotechnologies are
frequently called ’enabling technologies’.
Aside from this, nanotechnologies form part of the so called ’converging technologies’
which refer to a composition of technologies that are all likewise used to pursue a
common superior goal. As a converging technology and due to their further charac-
teristics, nanotechnologies do not only inﬂuence the organization of economic sectors
but also the civil society in which nanotechnologies are or shall be implanted. Nan-
otechnologies do not only require that the borders between the established techno-
industrial developments fade, thus requiring strong interdisciplinarity. They also
lead to newly emerging linkages of various economic sectors as well as social struc-
tures in several ﬁelds within society thus also incorporating possible systemic risks.
Looking at the current literature about converging technologies and risks’ analyses
in order to investigate the relationships between technology, economy and society,
we observe a kind of paradox: although almost each contribution mentions more
or less explicitly possible growth barriers on the one hand and risks related to the
development and applications of nanotechnologies on the other hand, both argu-
ments are nearly never brought together. Though well recognized, the converging
character of nanotechnologies seems hardly to be taken into account in its complete
sense. Convergence does not only cover the network of technologies embedded in
nanotechnologies. It also includes the network of actors involved in diﬀusion and
implantation. Or said in other words, aside from possible technological frictions,
1converging technologies also have to overcome structural divergences in the network
of actors involved in their diﬀusion and applications. In order to tap the full po-
tential of nanotechnologies, the growth barriers as well as possible risks emerging
from such structural inconsistencies seem to be of major importance. They directly
depend upon the level of acceptance and adaptation nanotechnologies in economic
and social contexts diﬀusing and using them. Managing such situations requires
high competencies related to the collective collaboration and communication about
these externalities and risks, to identify and to describe them adequately, bringing
together specialists and non-specialists of nanotechnologies.
Thus, the typical characteristics of nanotechnologies induce coordination require-
ments as well as coordination failures, not only between ﬁrms and sectors but also
at the level of the entire society. To reduce or even to eliminate these frictions is
the task of what we call converging institutions. How these institutions have to be
embellished in order to accommodate the particularities of nanotechnologies is the
main concern of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brings together the most important
building blocks required for the subsequent argumentation. These parts are embed-
ded in economic and social perspectives within Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 analyzes
stumbling blocks within the innovation process. Subsequently, converging institu-
tions are detailed and applied to the case of nanotechnologies within Section 6.
We then apply the concept of converging institutions to the already existing nano–
cluster in the metropolitan area of Grenoble/France in Section 7. The paper closes
with a short summary and some questions and remarks for future work.
2 Institutions and technologies: some building blocks
Institutional approaches in economy and sociology
According to North (1990, p. 3) ’Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or,
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.
[...] In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether polit-
ical, social, or economic.’ They provide structures but also impose restrictions on
human actions. Economic institutions frequently focus on the structure of property
rights and the presence and perfection of markets. Accordingly, institutions aﬀect
2the structure of economic incentives in society, inﬂuence investments in physical and
human capital, technology, and the organization of production. Recent discussions
highlight the necessity of ’appropriate institutions’ covering the idea that diﬀerent
institutional arrangements are appropriate at diﬀerent stages of economic develop-
ment and societal change (see Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2006)).1 Acemoglu et al.
(2005) also argue that institutions are, at least in part, determined by society, or a
segment of it and thus are endogenous. This also stresses the interaction between
economy and society.
A more sociological view emphasizes the role of institutions as mediations of various
sorts (symbolic, human, material–related) controlling and supporting the relation-
ships between actors, their activities and representations in diﬀerent ﬁelds of society,
and at diﬀerent phases of its transformations. Hence, institutions mediate regula-
tion of practices and representations: based on ﬁrst reﬂections of ethnologists and
anthropologists on the concept of institutions as ’a group of people united for the
pursuit of a simple or complex activity’ (see Malinowski (1945, p. 40)) analysts of
institutions concentrate on the relationships between actors in order to deﬁne insti-
tutions as mediative regulators between activities, practices and representations (see
MacIver and Page (1949, p. 16)). Institutions secure functions in society which have
been more or less restructured and redeﬁned in the process of regulation thus lead-
ing to an internal diversiﬁcation of the ’complex of status-role relationships’ which
is concerned within an institution (see Kaplan (1960, p. 179)). In addition, insti-
tutions adapt their functions and decisions with respect to changing environments.
This does not only precise the proﬁle of institutions; it also makes its interventions
in the public more appropriate and stresses the necessity for institutions to evolve
over time. To sum up: On the one hand, institutions can be understood as acting as
a bridge: they stimulate linkages and networking. On the other hand, they can be
seen as a guardian: they establish borders in form of frames of rules diﬀerentiating
and grouping societal actors and activities.
Sociological and economic interpretations of institutions do not contradict but com-
plement one another. Both stress the fact that institutions almost always embed
a general societal aim or an universal ideal that has to be communicated when an
1Note that these analyses compare alternative institutional arrangements between economies
near the technology frontiers to less developed economies whereas institutions in the context of
our paper explicitly focus on institutional settings that evolve along the technology frontier.
3institution acts. These aims and ideals have often philanthropic characteristics (e.g.
participating in the improvement of human knowledge) and thus provide the ba-
sis for the embodiment of institutions as converging institutions. Until now, these
properties and objectives consider institutions mostly as being reactive and with
this only to deﬁne responsive rules in order to reduce uncertainties of all kind which
may happen in societies’ life.2
Nanotechnologies, converging technologies and technological platforms
Another building block of this paper refers to the linkages, (possible) coordination
failures and technology platforms of the so–called converging technologies. These
refer to the convergences on a common global goal by insights and techniques of
basic science and technology: converging technologies are enabling technologies and
scientiﬁc knowledge systems that add to each other for the achievement of a shared
aim. For example, singly or together, NBIC–technologies (nano, bio, info, cogno)
are likely to contribute to such convergences as e. g. for improving human perfor-
mance (see Nordmann (2004, p. 19) or Roco and Bainbridge (2002, p. 282)).3 Hence
nanotechnologies form part of the converging technologies. Nevertheless, some au-
thors noticed that this converging property of nanotechnologies may also be its most
controversial one once related to the existing structures within society.4
In addition to this, nanotechnologies are frequently interpreted as being a general
2One exception is the concept of ’institutional entrepreneurs’ as developed by Maguire et al.
(2004) and applied to nanotechnologies by Mangematin et al. (2005).
3NBIC–convergence for Improving Human Performance is the name of a prominent agenda for
converging technology research in the US. In Canada, ’Bio–Systemics Synthesis’ suggests another
agenda for converging technology research while Converging Technologies for the European Knowl-
edge Society (CTEKS) designates the European approach. It prioritizes the setting of a particular
goal for converging technology research. This presents challenges and opportunities for research
and governance alike, allowing for an integration of technological potential, recognition of lim-
its, European needs, economic opportunities, and scientiﬁc interests (see again Nordmann (2004)
for details). Defending a strict technological classiﬁcation of the expression ’converging technol-
ogy’, Roco refers it to the combination of four major NBIC provinces of science and technology,
namely: (i) nanoscience and nanotechnology; (ii) biotechnology and biomedicine, including genetic
engineering; (iii) information technology, including advanced computing and communications; (iv)
cognitive science, including cognitive neuroscience (Roco and Bainbridge (2002, p. 282)). For a
broader application of this expression, cf. the description given by Wood et al. (2003, p. 23): ’Many
of the applications arising from nanotechnology may be the result of the convergence of several
technologies.’
4See e. g. Dupuy (2004, p. 75ﬀ.) or Berne and Schummer (2005).
4purpose technology thus providing generic functions that may be adopted to a mul-
titude of uses. In case of nanotechnologies theses functions include the possibility to
manipulate molecular structures or to assemble single atoms.5 According to Lipsey
et al. (1998) or Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) general purpose technologies
involve huge potentials for improvement at the beginning of their development, a
multitude of possible uses and hence an impact on nearly every part of the econ-
omy and induce major changes of production structures, network relationships and
the organization of entire societies. Another main attribute is given by the strong
complementarities to already existing technologies. As such, nanotechnologies form
part of technological platforms that organize further actions (e. g. R&D), enable and
constrain them (see Robinson et al. (2006, p. 4f.)). In this sense, traditional sectors
can be interpreted as the interaction of several technological platforms, giving the
network character of the involved actors more importance.6
Figure 1 demonstrates the interdependencies between several sectors, ﬁrms and/or
actors that include nanotechnologies within the production process. Using the sim-
plest case, the hierarchical interdependencies as well as the network character may
be most suitably illustrated by a technology tree. Nanotechnologies represent the
sector of the general purpose technology and are denoted be GPT whereas ASi re-
ﬂect the downstream industries that actually or potentially use the general purpose
technology or augmented products as intermediates. Aside from vertical relation-
ships, there exist also horizontal linkages between actors at the same level of the
value creation chain. These horizontal as well as possible newly emerging verti-
cal linkages are indicated by the dashed lines. Note that such a conjunction of
horizontally and/or vertically linked actors could also be interpreted as building a
joint technological platform.7 The interaction requires a lot of coordination and
consequently failures may arise.
5Other generic functions and the corresponding general purpose technologies are the rotary
motion in the case of the steam engine or binary logic in the case of ICT.
6According to the European Union technological platforms are being set up which bring together
companies, research institutions, the ﬁnancial world and the regulatory authorities at the European
level to deﬁne a common research agenda which should mobilize a critical mass of – national and
European – public and private resources (Robinson et al. (2006, p. 8, footnote 8)).







Figure 1: Technology tree: horizontal and vertical linkages
Applying these rather general arguments to the peculiarities of nanotechnologies,
merging it with institutional aspects and analyzing the corresponding economic
and social implications makes clear that mediation could improve the outcome of
these interactions. This results in the concept of what we denote by ’converging
institutions’.
3 Nanotechnologies as a general purpose technology
Within Figure 1 nanotechnologies correspond to universities and research institu-
tions that continuingly develop the general purpose technology. As already argued,
nanotechnologies may be implemented in a multitude of uses in applying sectors thus
reﬂecting the pervasiveness of the technology.8 Applying sectors could be e. g. the
chemical industry (AS1), microelectronics (AS2) or pharmacy (AS3). New materials
may be demanded by further downstream sectors such as aviation industries (AS11
which uses ﬁre resistant materials for inboard equipment) or automobile industries
(AS12 which utilize scratch–resistant lacquers). Analogously, ICT industries make
use of nano components to augment the calculating capacity of computers. Again,
these are used by downstream sectors as e. g. automobile industries (AS21: board
8Roco (2001, p. 355) underlines this, seeing in the converging property characterizing nanotech-
nologies a possible ’synergism among the converging ﬁelds play[ing] a determining role in the birth
and growth of new technologies.’ There are lots of examples of such applied synergisms as the
implantation of nanotechnologies in the human body, in microelectronic devices, in chemical gaz,
cars’ brine, liquid cleaning agent (see also BMBF (2004).
6computers) or medicine technics (AS22: magnetic resonance tomograph). Both ﬁre
resistant materials and scratch resistant lacquers may not only be used within avi-
ation but also in automobile industries. Similar relationships may be identiﬁed for
other downstream sectors. Note that sometimes, these relationships between two
downstream sectors do not exist until they make use of nanotechnologies.
Another feature of general purpose technologies are induced technological dynamics.
Due to continuing innovation and learning eﬀects, the generic function of the ge-
neral purpose technology may be provided at less costs and/or in a better quality.
The use of the general purpose technology in downstream sectors becomes more
attractive, and proﬁts there increase. As a consequence, the application of the (aug-
mented) general purpose technology becomes interesting also for other sectors, and
the ﬁelds of uses increase. Applied to nanotechnologies, the production of continu-
atively improved nano–particles, and thus decreasing costs, may be mentioned. As
consequence nano–particles are now used in a wide range, e. g. in suntan lotion or
lacquers.
The third constituent property of general purpose technologies is the existence of
innovational complementarities between the sectors of the general purpose technol-
ogy and the application sectors. This reﬂects the phenomenon that technological
progress in one sector also spurs progress in the other sector and vice versa. Both
sectors are linked by their innovating activities wherefore the proﬁt in one sec-
tor also depends on the technological conditions in the other sector. Applied to
nanotechnologies, these interdependencies may be illustrated together with micro-
electronics or information technologies as applying sectors. It is undoubted that
due to their calculation capacities information technologies have contributed signif-
icantly to the emergence of nanotechnologies. All illustrations of nanoscale eﬀects
and structures are based on electronically constructed pictures. Since more than 30
years the capacity of computers doubles every 12–18 months (Moore’s law). But
within the next several years, physical boundaries will interrupt this development
since at nano–scales, the technological characteristics of solid state physics cease
to hold and the usual transistor will be unusable. Then quantum physics become
relevant and molecules – manipulated by nanotechnologies – could replace the well
known transistor. Consequently, technological progress in nanotechnologies become
a pre–condition for future innovations in microtechnology which anew spurs techno-
logical progress in the nanotechnologies’ sector.
7Fourth, general purpose technologies induce major changes of production processes
and work–life organization.9 Applied to nanotechnologies, this argument is until
now undiﬀerentiated since these technologies are still at the very beginning of their
development. But just to get a vague idea, one could imagine how for example
functional materials that measure functions of the human body and transmit the
results to the medicine makes lots of sick people much more independent compared
to their situation today thus allowing for restructuring daily life.
To sum up: nanotechnologies incorporate all characteristics of general purpose tech-
nologies as deﬁned by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) and Lipsey et al. (1998).
Consequently, the ’usual’ implications of general purpose technologies, particularly
coordination failures, externalities as well as the reorganization of economic and
social networks, also become relevant in the analysis of the implications of nan-
otechnologies for economy and society.
4 Ambivalence of nanotechnologies
The emergence of nanotechnologies incorporates lots of beneﬁts for economy and
society. Technological process reduces production costs, provides new and/or im-
proved products and is accepted to be the main source of ongoing economic growth.10
But as any other technological innovation, nanotechnologies often induce a process
of ’creative destruction’:11 on the one hand, they create unusual development pos-
sibilities.12 But on the other hand, they also enforce strong modiﬁcations or even
destructions of older processes and habits.13 Since the emergence of nanotechnolo-
9An example of the implications for work–life–organization can be illustrated in the context of
the general purpose technology ’electricity’. Its development and diﬀusion made people indepen-
dent from daylight and with this had a very strong impact on the organization of daily life.
10See Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004) for this argument and an overview over the most essential
growth determinants.
11This expression draws back on Schumpeter (1950) who describes destruction of the old as being
an inherent part of the innovation process.
12Examples are genetically modiﬁed organisms for the production of food, improvement of health
care for people suﬀering of cancer or diabetes, improvement of the eﬃciency and the safety of
vehicles by the use of ’on-board’ supercomputers (see e. g. Silverstein et al. (1995) or SwissRe
(1998, p. 6)).
13For example, the secondary eﬀects of new molecules improved with nanotechnologies in order
to make people awake during a week or the use of nanotechnologies in medicine which could
8gies enables unlimited linkages between every element in economy and society, they
may also reinforce the sources of loose connections within the networks built. Thus,
nanotechnologies bring us in a more complex world where increasing growth op-
portunities and decreasing structural consistencies in society have to be balanced.
Besides, the entire potential may only be realized if all adjustment processes going
along with creative destruction are completed. Thereby the development and diﬀu-
sion of nanotechnologies may favor the emergence of systemic risks by de–structuring
all dimensions of already existing networks thus aﬀecting entire spheres of society.
Altogether, does this mean that we have to fear nanotechnologies or do the chances
prevail? Actually, the circumstances are more complex. First of all, it has to be
noticed that nanotechnologies are not an innovation in itself. They get their real
innovative character as embedded at the nanoscale in all possible (i.e. biological,
mineral, chemical, mechanical) media, thus realizing sometimes also unexpected
convergences between people, social systems and environments.
Second, these convergences do not have only positive eﬀects. While relying on lots
of actors involved in its development, diﬀusion and the use of nanotechnologies,
they also multiply the risks of network-inconsistencies and network-failures. This
could hinder or even interrupt the innovation process of nanotechnologies, thus re-
inforcing possible breaks and ruptures between the involved actors. Indeed, the
convergences growing out of the diﬀusion and implantation of nanotechnologies in
society are based on existing functional and structural dependencies but also create
new ones. These so called path dependencies in the sense that earlier investments
and competencies shape what can be done later, once being established, hardly can
push medicine to abandon open-minded, holistic caring for patients (see e. g. Timmermans and
Angell (2001)). Indeed, as Branscomb et al. (2001, p. 26) observe ’in various segments of the
public there is confusion and ambivalence about the mission of research in science and technology.’
See also Douglas and Isherwood (1979) or Rosenberg (1982). At the opposite side, Roco and
Bainbridge (2002, p. 282) defend the view of a radical functionalization of society understood as
the progress due to the application of nanotechnologies: ’This progress is expected to change the
main societal paths, towards a more functional and coarser mesh instead of the less organized and
ﬁner one we have now.’ The duty to involve the public in the largely unknown consequences of
the applications of nanotechnologies in economy and society is that of public media: ’The public
media should increase high-quality coverage of science and technology, on the basis of the new
convergent paradigm, to inform citizens so they can participate wisely in debates about ethical
issues such as unexpected eﬀects on inequality, policies concerning diversity, and the implications
of transforming human nature’ (ibid. page 294).
9be revised. In extreme, given that a critical point within the innovation process of
nanotechnologies is reached, path dependencies can lead to the impossibility to de-
velop nanotechnologies anyway further in a given area. This could have desastrous
consequences for existing economic sectors (as e. g. bankrupts that are due to the
impossibility to sell nano products and services for which there is no need any more)
or individuals engaged in the innovation process or in the use of nanotechnologies
(e. g. medicaments which can’t be provided any more).
Third, another cardinal property of nanotechnologies, their size, makes it impossible
to deliver them directly in the public. They require to be implemented in media
(human body, objects, liquid, gas, natural environment) thus reﬂecting the charac-
teristic of an on–board technology. This explains why the economic sectors are often
considered as the prime actors to be taken into account in the development and
diﬀusion process of nanotechnologies. Actually, economic sectors do not only sup-
port the development but also the diﬀusion of nanotechnologies by interacting with
each other (developers, scientists, technicians, engineers). The public is more likely
considered as ’public of end users’, whose concerns are the applications and related
uses of nanotechnologies. This distinction between the development, diﬀusion and
the applications’ areas is more than only a pedagogical one, even if in practice, there
are no impermeable borders between both sides. The distinction allows us to iden-
tify coordination failures and thus economic growth barriers related to the actors
of the technology platform on the one hand, as well as risks emerging out of the
diﬀusion and implantation of nanotechnologies in the public on the other hand. As
a consequence the innovation process of nanotechnologies, as well as nanotechnolo-
gies on their part, are deeply ambivalent.14 Thus, the question asked by Kearnes
14This particular signiﬁcation of the ambivalence of technologies has already been given attention
(see Silverstein et al. (1995, p. 12)): ’the complexity of the relationship [which technologies embody;
IO&CP] comes out as a kind of ambivalence of the public toward the whole science-technology
complex. The public may be positive on things like improvements in their quality of life and
at the same time fearful of the changes in values, with a sense perhaps of social disintegration
that may be vaguely tied to what’s going on here.’ Bennett and Sarewitz (2005, p. 1) observe
that ’people have converged around the notion that, whatever nanotechnology is, and whatever it
will become, its implications for society are going to be transformational, perhaps radically so, in
social realms as diverse as privacy, workforce, security, health, and human cognition.’ For Roco and
Bainbridge (2005, p. 282), ’converging technologies integrated from the nanoscale could determine
a tremendous improvement in human abilities and societal outcomes.’ Cf. also in the same vein,
the report of the European Commission (2004) as well as Whitman (2006). Dupuy (2004, p. 60)
10et al. (2006, p. 14) in their report on nanotechnologies in the UK remains of urgent
actuality: ’How are individuals and institutions, confronted with rapid technological
change, to imagine new social possibilities, and choose among them wisely? And
how may all of this pan out [...] for the development process generally?’
5 Stumbling blocks in the innovation process
According to the speciﬁc conceptualization of both economics and social sciences,
we use the term ’externalities’ in order to describe prior economic risks related to
coordination or markets failures. We refer to the term ’systemic risk’ to take into
account the more general societal risks related to the use of nanotechnologies in
the public which could unstructure their individual life and social habits thus also
reshaping societal relationships (see Roco (2005)).
Economic level
As already illustrated in the context of Figure 1, lots of interactions between up-
stream and downstream sectors exist. These interdependencies do not only arise
in a production context but also during the innovation processes within the ﬁrms,
and they incorporate two fundamental externalities (see Bresnahan and Trajtenberg
(1995)):
• Vertical externalities: Due to the innovational complementarities, the innova-
tion activities in upstream and downstream industries are related, and both
sectors have linked payoﬀs. The familiar problem of imperfect appropriability
of the social returns arises, except that here it runs in both ways. This bilateral
moral hazard problem implies that neither side will have suﬃcient incentives
to innovate. Altogether, both sectors innovate too little and too late.
• Horizontal externalities: Applying sectors include actual and possible users of
the general purpose technology. Their demand depends positively upon the
quality and negatively upon the price of the general purpose technology. At
points it out dexterously when he shows the ambivalence of the slogan ’Bringing Nanotechnology
to Life’ used by any research center in the ﬁeld of nanobiotechnology. It expresses the will to use
nanotechnologies in order to make progress in human biology; but, so Dupuy, it is impossible not
to imagine that it remains related with the old utopia to fabricate life using these technologies.
11the same time, the quality within the general purpose technology sector de-
pends upon marginal production costs and upon the (aggregate) technological
level of all applying sectors. Hence, if one single applying sector innovates
to increase its own technological level (with the goal to reduce own produc-
tion costs) also the aggregate level of the applying sectors will increase. This
leads to improvements of the general purpose technology and hence to reduced
costs not only in the originally innovating sector but also in the other (non–
innovating) downstream sectors. Consequently all applying sectors beneﬁt
from innovations of a single applying sector. Again, this characteristic induces
a moral hazard problem: why should one applying sector innovate if it could
beneﬁt at zero costs from the innovation in another sector?15
Societal level: Until now, societal risks generated through the uses of converging
technologies are hardly discussed in the literature, and if so, they mainly concern
the application in areas dealing with life sciences or biotechnologies. It is often
unnoticed that there is a deep lack of independent safety assessments and regulations
concerning the implantation of nanotechnologies in consumption goods.16 Until
now, little attention is given to risks that directly threaten the social acceptance
of nanotechnologies in the areas in which they are or shall be implanted.17 It is
thus of major importance to understand and to assess these risks, and given this,
to analyze possible communication strategies about these risks and their transfer
between techno–science, economy and society (see e. g. Oriordan et al. (1989)). It
would then be possible (i) to transmit information about risks, which requires (ii)
mediations that (iii) shape trust in the public about the transmitted information,
and could afterwards (iv) prepare individuals to get involved in the control of the
implantation and the use of new technologies. The management of risks successes
at both levels of
• Stereotypes associated with nanotechnologies: They rise up strongly in the case
15This phenomenon is summarized by the term ’dual–inducement hypothesis’ thus describing the
interrelationships between the innovational activities in the sector of the general purpose technology
and the applying sectors (see Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995)).
16An exception is given by genetically modiﬁed food. First analysis are conducted by the (see
European Commission (2005) ) or Mehta (2002).
17Note that there already exist several anti-nanotechnologies’ movements, see e. g.
http://pmo.erreur404.org/Necrotechnologies.htm or http://pmo.erreur404.org/. Growing systemic
risks in the late modernity are in detail discussed Beck (1986) or Luhmann (1991, 1990).
12of nanotechnologies because of their invisibility and their character of an all
purpose technology. This may bring the feeling in the public that everybody
will be under surveillance always and everywhere. The communication about
nanotechnologies pursues the goal to manage the stereotypes associated with
these technologies in order to facilitate their acceptance and thus leading to a
successful implantation in the public;
• Control of the implantation and use of nanotechnologies: The feeling of loose
of control by private individuals could lead to the technocratic vision of ex-
perts that manipulate nanotechnologies at their convenience (and in secrecy)
in order to robotize the population.18 This may create severe gaps between
the developers of nanotechnologies, the economic sectors diﬀusing nano prod-
ucts and the public. Another discrepancy may arise within the public itself
between those people who want to beneﬁt and make use of nanotechnologies,
and those who won’t be contacted by nanotechnologies. Thus, the manage-
ment of control is an important social challenge in order to shape trust in the
public where nanotechnologies will be implanted.
To sum up: nanotechnologies are not new on their part but because they enable un-
expected interactions between expert knowledge developing nanotechnologies, eco-
nomic sectors diﬀusing them and the civil society in which nanotechnologies are
implanted and used. These interactions are not automatically spontaneous results
of the development, diﬀusion and implantation of nanotechnologies but bring about
possible risks of systemic divergences that are caused by non-controllable or un-
wanted interactions between involved actors, technological objects and embedded
environments. Supporting these interactions means ﬁrst not to take the convergences
that nanotechnologies may favor in society as obvious, but instead to understand
how to regulate their ambivalence and oscillation between expected growth and
risks of systemic inadequacy. Following analogous intuitions, some authors already
suggested that ’Governments and civil society organizations (...) should establish
an International Convention for the Evaluation of New Technologies (...), including
mechanisms to monitor technology development’ (ETC-Group (2003, p. 6)). Other
18This is one of the most current objection raised by interest groups that decline against nano-
technologies. One example is the group ’Opposition Grenobloise aux Nécrotechnologies’ in Greno-
ble/France.
13authors signalized that organizations experiencing uncertainty as well as organiza-
tions dealing with innovations in general and with nanotechnologies in particular
’will be more likely to adopt new institutions that will help them deal with the
uncertainty they are experiencing.’ (Guthrie (1998, p. 477)).19 Bresnahan and Tra-
jtenberg (1995, p. 3) argue: ’However, where there is potential for coordination
failures there is also room for coordination, and which ultimately prevails depends
upon the institutional arrangements that are developed, alongside or in lieu of mar-
ket arrangements.’ We focus on this last more explorative recommendation without
totally declining the ﬁrst one, considering the regulation of nanotechnologies devel-
opment and applications under the viewpoint of converging institutions. How could
they support the convergences which nanotechnologies undertake in the environ-
ments in which they may be implanted?
6 From nanotechnologies to converging institutions
As argued above, nanotechnologies incorporate huge potentials for improving wel-
fare. But due to the interdependencies of the various actors, technological comple-
mentarities and the dynamics within the innovation process, frictions at the eco-
nomic and the societal level are in all probability. Since coordination failures and
social risks may disturb the innovation process of nanotechnologies and hence re-
duce maximum possible welfare, room for improvement is given. We now analyze
how dedicated institutions, henceforth called converging institutions, contribute to
improvements of the decentralized decisions.
Figure 2 illustrates the interdependencies between all stakeholders involved in the
innovation process of nanotechnologies: the interdependencies between upstream
and downstream ﬁrms are adopted from Figure 1 and assembled to an exemplary
technology platform, embedded in the rest of the economy, and interacting also with
society. Converging institutions may be assigned to the two lines of argumentation
from above:
19Heinze (2006, p. 22) observes in analogous terms: ’For describing and analysing the formation
of new science-based ﬁelds of technologies, it is essential to understand the interface between
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Figure 2: Technological, economic and social levels.
Starting points for converging institutions
• Economic level: Due to the innovational complementarities the innovation
activities of one single actor aﬀects the outcomes of the other agents. Conse-
quently existing sub–optimality aﬀects all involved agents. Converging insti-
tutions are thus interpreted as institutions that reduce or remove coordination
failures that arise due to the interrelatedness between the ﬁrms. Starting
points for concrete intervention at a vertical level could be performed e. g. by
technology–push strategies. At a horizontal level, coordination of individual
demand of the general purpose technology could increase aggregate demand,
thus reﬂecting a demand–pull strategy.
• Societal level: A converging institution mediates the processes by which (i)
nanotechnologies are integrated into society in the form of nanotechnological
innovations, and by which (ii) society integrates nanotechnologies in diﬀusing
them, e.g. in selling, using, considering or not considering or debating about
them.20 As many other institutions, a converging institution may be basically
20The need for such kind of institution is not new (see Sarewitz (2004, p. 29)), although nobody
15interpreted as involving actors dealing together with various organizational
structures and processes. Their main task is to decompose systemic risks and
preferably to harmonize the communication about them.
However, as stressed by some workings on the couple ’converging technologies and
institutions’,21 the converging character of nanotechnologies supposes that an in-
stitution dealing with them and their universe is not only a reactive structure ad-
ministrating the synergies between the actors involved in the development and in
the application of nanotechnologies. Their place is not outside the convergences
nanotechnologies enable, but inside of them. This kind of institution has to as-
similate the convergences between technology, science, economy, and society which
nanotechnologies enable. Converging institutions are thus responsible for the de-
velopments and applications of nanotechnologies just as any other actor involved
in the innovation process of nanotechnologies. Correspondingly, they have to take
initiatives in the planning of and the communication about the possible inconsis-
tencies in the development and the application of nanotechnologies, as well as of
the related public fears, economic externalities and systemic risks which nanotech-
nologies could enable. Such specialized institutions can be labelled as converging
institutions. They do not only have to fulﬁl responsive functions in supporting and
regulating nanotechnologies. They also have to actively act as one actor within the
convergences that nanotechnologies favor in order to support and develop them. To
put it metaphorically: a converging institution is not only a transmission instance
enabling the unproblematic development and delivering of nanotechnologies from
science and industry to economy and society; rather, it is a translation instance,
which actively constructs exchange possibilities between all actors involved. As an
interactive agent within the nanotechnologies’ networks, converging institutions are
then22
• Collaborative: Converging institutions have to make involved actors commu-
seems to refer it to the speciﬁcs of nanotechnologies, which is their converging property.
21See e. g. the project description concerning the Center for Nanotechnology and Society at
Arizona State University (http://cns.asu.edu/network/asu.htm).
22Our focus diﬀers from the institutional approaches of Maguire et al. (2004), which deﬁne insti-
tutional entrepreneurship as activities of the actors who have an interest in particular institutional
arrangements, and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones.
See also Mangematin et al. (2005) who discuss cluster–institutionalizing entrepreneurs as those who
promote the creation and the institutionalization of clusters in the context of nanotechnologies.
16nicate even if they do not use the same language, and even if they don’t
evolve at the same speed, in the same direction, at the same time and for the
same reasons regarding the development and applications of nanotechnologies.
As a consequence, converging institutions neither follow a bottom–up nor a
top–down approach but rather fulﬁl the characteristics of a network on tehir
parts.23
• Responsive: Converging institutions have to act for the encounter of technolog-
ical, scientiﬁc, industrial (more concerned with the ﬁrst point of the deﬁnition),
economic, social, and political stakes which nanotechnologies carry (more con-
cerned with the second point of the deﬁnition) considering their respective
speciﬁcs.
• Flexible: Converging institutions have to be directly sensible to the changes
in the convergences between actors involved in converging technologies. This
gives converging institutions the possibility to quickly take into account pos-
sible inconsistencies of these convergences, and to better identify, manage and
communicate about risks which the implantation of nanotechnologies in soci-
ety carries with itself. The general purpose of the converging institution is then
to shape relationships between converging technologies and all actors involved
in nanotechnologies, particularly those who may beneﬁt from the outcomes
of nanotechnologies but also have to assume the related uncertainty of their
implantation in economy and society.
The concept of converging institutions can be seen as an example of the so called
’churn theory’ of knowledge value and innovation (Bozeman (2005, p. 5f)). The word
’churn’ implies no particular direction of scientiﬁc innovative outcomes. They may be
positive, negative, neutral, or, most likely, mixed. This is almost what we are facing
with nanotechnologies and this is what converging institutions assume as an actor
involved in the convergences which nanotechnologies favor. As Bozeman (2005, p. 6)
observes, the position of converging institutions can be deﬁned as it considers all
parties and itself ’as part of the knowledge value collective because each is producing
23Bottom–up and top–down concepts in the context of nanotechnologies are analyzed by VDI
(2005) with a more technological focus, and by Robinson et al. (2006) with a more sociological
focus.
17knowledge, using it or enabling its use.’24 Converging institutions, then, have a
major role in reﬂecting that the converging capacity of nanotechnologies doesn’t
only depend on the whole ﬁelds of science, but also on the whole ﬁelds of societies
bringing science to the multiple uses which characterize converging technologies. If
one says about the development of technologies in cold-war that ’Codeword science
engendered a codeword community’ (Cloud (2001, p. 244)), converging technologies
prepare a new era for a collaborative society in which converging institutions are
of central stake, shaping the relationships between nanotechnologies, economy and
society. Therefore, it is to expect that converging institutions will become increasing
attention in the research agenda on nanotechnologies as well as in the management
of externalities and societal risks related to their implantation in society.
7 La Maison des Micro– et Nanotechnologies (MMN).
An emerging converging institution?
Considering the innovation processes of nanotechnologies, it becomes obvious that
increasing attention to the management of externalities and societal risks related to
their implantation in society. Besides, converging institutions play a central role in
this context. One example of a potential converging institution is the ’Maison des
Micro- et Nanotechnologies (MMN)’ developed at the ’Pôle d’innovation en MIcro
et NAnoTEChnologies (MINATEC)’ in Grenoble (France).25
MINATEC exists as a project since 2000 in the metropolitan area of Grenoble. It has
been planned and supported by the French state, the region Rhône-Alpes, the Dpt.
Isère, the public institutions Grenoble Alpes Métropole and the Caisse des Dépôts
et Consignations, the city of Grenoble, the Centre d’Energie Atomique (CEA) and
the Institut National Polythechnique (INP) in Grenoble. The region Rhône-Alpes
has been chosen for the construction of the pool because of its economic excellence
and the prevailing industrial strucutres. The convention of the 18.01.2002 and the
24In this sense, converging technologies and converging institutions lead to more complex (loosed
coupled) networks of diﬀusion and application of innovations as, e. g. those envisaged by Etzkowitz
(2003) within the Triple Helix Model declining the various possible relationships between university-
science-government in the promotion of technological innovations.
25Note that there exist various regions that also develop nanotechnologies strategically. An
overview can be found at the homepage of the nanodistrict project, www.nanodistrict.org.
18ﬁrst ﬁnancial support of 150 billions Euros led to the realization of the project (see
INP-Communiqué de Presse (2002), p. 12). MINATEC has been inaugurated on the
1st of June 2006.
MINATEC is a mixed structure made of public and private research and investments.
It has been organized in three platforms, namely (i) the platform education, (ii)
the platform research focusing on microtechnology, biochips and microsystems for
applications in the ﬁelds of communicating objects (clothes, robots for kitchen, etc.),
and (iii) the platform economy for the developments of start-ups or bigger industrial
conglomerates which work together with the platforms education and research. In
this context, the MMN has been developed as a center for the getting together of
these platforms, and more generally of nanotechnologies, economy and society (see
ibid., p. 11). The main aims of the MMN are:
• to accelerate and optimize the process of innovation;
• to build transdisciplinary and international networks;
• to favor the encounter between the old and the new in order to adapt the
identity of the region at the changes brought by nanotechnologies (see INP-
Communiqué de Presse (2002), p. 11).
In order to perform these goals, the MMN works together with the Observatoire des
Micro- et Nano Technologies (OMNT) developed at the initiative of the CEA and
the CNRS, and built in February 2005. The OMNT is unique in Europe. It provides
information about nanotechnologies and their applications in order to communicate
about possible externalities and risks related to nanotechnologies and to prevent the
stereotypes associated with nanotechnologies.26 As such, the MMN gives an example
of a typical converging institution structure. Its work faces the main challenges of
converging institutions which can be summarized as follows:
• Economic level: eﬃciently support the diﬀusion of nanotechnologies so that
the economic sectors may beneﬁt from the convergences between developers
26This is one of the motivation often associated with the arguments underlining the ne-
cessity of the build of the MMN at MINATEC (see also cf. also Gutierrez (2004) at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/nano/default.html
19of nanotechnologies and ﬁrms at the same level of the value creation chain
to reach the expected economic growth potential that nanotechnologies are
attempted to bring about.
• Societal level: manage the stereotypes associated with nanotechnologies in
order to communicate about them and to shape trust in the public regarding
the implantation and the use of nanotechnologies in civil society.
Since converging institutions are innovative institutional structures on the making,
as the example of the MMN shows, and since such structures haven’t been studied
until now, it is an exciting challenge to observe closer their emergence related to
the centers developing nanotechnologies in order to know how they will act as a
mediation instance in the network of actors involved within the entire innovation
process, from the development over diﬀusion up to the implantation in civil society.
Converging institutions have to proof their capabilities to manage the structural
externalities and systemic risks related to possible inconsistent convergences in this
network and the resulting consequences for economy and society.
To sum up: until now it has been shown that form and content of the concept of con-
verging institution, and having underlined its major role not as a reactive instance
beside the network of actors involved in nanotechnologies, but as an interactive, re-
sponsible and ﬂexible mediative structure within this network, let us conclude with
three observations bring the theory nearer to the practice. First, as the MMN illus-
trates, it is to expect more than one prototype of converging institution–structure
particularly regarding the speciﬁcity of the region in which nanotechnologies have to
be developed. Therefore, one main stake of the investigation of converging institu-
tions is to identify types of converging institutions corresponding to the area where
nanotechnologies are developed. In this respect, an investigation of converging insti-
tutions should provide a diﬀerentiated analysis of speciﬁc functions and structures
growing out of converging institutions that are of special interest in a given region,
with which these converging institutions manage systemic risks and market failures
related to nanotechnologies. In this sense, it is possible to empirically diﬀerentiate
the concept of convergence which nanotechnologies induce in order to investigate the
speciﬁcs of the network of actors involved in nanotechnologies in which converging
institutions have been embedded. This ﬁrst step in the investigation of converging
institutions enables a second one, leading to isolate shared properties that each con-
20verging institution develops in its context in order to be eﬃcient in its proper action.
This delivers empirical elements in order to get an empirically informed concept of
converging institution. Third, the investigations have to focus on the most impor-
tant institutional determinants resulting out of the analyses developed in the former
two steps in order to give an evaluation of the changes they could enable in the eco-
nomic and sociocultural sectors given the regions in which converging technologies
have to be developed and diﬀused. Following these steps, it will then be possible to
investigate instruments that stimulate the public discussion about nanotechnologies
thus leading to a global and an unequivocal exploitation of the entire innovative
potentialities of nanotechnologies.
8 Conclusions
This paper derives the concept of converging institution as consequence of economic
and social considerations of nanotechnologies as part of the so called converging
technologies. This concept is based on the entire innovation process beginning with
research and development, diﬀusion (here mostly interpreted as the diﬀusion between
upstream and downstream industries) up to the implantation of nanotechnologies
in society. The paper merges both economic and social perspective and thus re-
sults in the interdisciplinary concept of converging institutions. Three constituents
characteristics that deﬁne the type of a converging institution are derived: they are
responsive, collaborative and ﬂexible, that is, converging institutions evolve along
the development process of nanotechnologies. Then the concept is applied to a pos-
sible converging institution, namely the MMN in Grenoble/France. However, there
are several caveats that have to be analyzed during future work, among them an-
swers to the following questions. How may converging institutions be divided from
traditional institutions that also arise in the context of newly emerging technolo-
gies? How may converging institutions be implemented in regional, national and
supranational levels? From where do converging institutions get their knowledge to
act in a welfare enhancing manner? Thus there is much work left to be done.
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